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Abstract: 
Prospective memory (PM) is the cognitive ability to remember to fulfill intended action plans at 
the appropriate future moment. Current theories assume that PM fulfillment draws on attentional 
processes. Accordingly, pending PM intentions interfere with other ongoing tasks to the extent to 
which both tasks rely on the same processes. How do people manage the competition between 
PM and ongoing-task demands? Based on research relating mind wandering and attentional 
control (Kane & McVay, 2012), we argue that people may not only change the way they process 
ongoing-task stimuli when given a PM intention, but they may also engage in less off-task 
thinking than they otherwise would. That is, people focus more strongly on the tasks at hand and 
dedicate considerable conscious thought to the PM goal. We tested this hypothesis by asking 
subjects to periodically report on their thoughts during prototypical PM (and control) tasks. 
Task-unrelated thought rates dropped when participants performed an ongoing task while 
holding a PM intention versus performing the ongoing task alone (Experiment 1), even when PM 
demands were minimized (Experiment 2) and more so when PM execution was especially 
rewarded (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that PM demands not only elicit a cost to 
ongoing-task processing, but they also induce a stronger on-task focus and promote conscious 
thoughts about the PM intention.  
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Article: 
Event-based PM refers to the host of cognitive processes that enable us to remember to fulfill an 
intention under appropriate future circumstances, such as giving a friend a message the next time 
one sees her or stopping to run an errand on the way to work (cf., McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
In the laboratory, event-based PM tasks are typically embedded in an ongoing task that requires 
some attention and keeps participants busy. The PM task may be to respond to certain stimuli 
from the ongoing task (PM targets) with a special key. PM targets occur infrequently—usually 
on less than 10% of all trials (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007)—and so the PM task mimics the 
common situation of having to remember to perform an action at a certain moment while being 
actively engaged in other activities. 
As the PM/ongoing-task ensemble comprises two tasks—the ongoing task and the PM task—it 
appears similar to traditional divided attention paradigms where two tasks have to be performed 
simultaneously (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; McDowd & Craik, 1988). 
However, the PM ensemble differs from traditional dual-task situations in some important 
respects (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000). First, the PM intention is executed after a delay and thus 
is likely to be retrieved from long-term memory when needed, rather than being actively 
sustained in working memory. Second, the PM task is executed much less frequently than the 
ongoing task (usually on not more than 10% of all trials), which prioritizes the ongoing task over 
the PM task. Third, the PM task is executed in response to PM targets without an explicit 
reminder. 
A core question in PM research is how people manage to fulfill their intentions, self-initiated and 
at the appropriate moment, under these conditions. Building on the divided-attention literature 
(Craik et al., 1996), a straightforward assumption would be that attentional processes are 
distributed between tasks, allowing both the ongoing and the PM task to be fulfilled 
simultaneously (Smith, 2003). But what is the nature of this process sharing? Will engaging the 
PM task only occupy mechanisms that would otherwise optimize ongoing-task performance? 
Recent research on mind wandering indicates that, even while performing attention-demanding 
tasks, people’s attention sometimes drifts away from the currently to-be-performed tasks to task-
unrelated thoughts (TUTs; Kane & McVay, 2012; Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015). We therefore argue that when holding a PM intention, people may not only recruit 
executive control mechanisms for the PM task that they would have used to perform the ongoing 
task otherwise. They may, additionally, think more about the current task goals (ongoing-task 
and PM intention) instead, thereby reducing their engagement in TUTs. This reduction of TUTs 
may happen consciously (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) or as a byproduct of a stronger 
attentional focus on the tasks at hand (Kane & McVay, 2012). Relating this general idea to the 
PM field may imply that, in addition to engaging in PM processing at a cost to ongoing-task 
processing (e.g., Hicks, Marsh, & Cook, 2005), individuals also generally focus more on the 
entire PM/ongoing-task ensemble. Before we describe the studies we conducted to test this 
hypothesis in detail, we will first review existing PM theories and further elaborate on how the 
consideration of research on TUTs may increase our understanding of PM. 
Attention-Demanding PM Processing 
Current theories assume that PM performance relies more or less heavily on attentional processes 
that are also required to perform the ongoing task. One prominent attentional account of PM is 
the preparatory attention and memory theory (PAM; Smith, 2003, 2010, 2016), according to 
which, controlled preparatory processing (i.e., rehearsal and monitoring processes) must be 
engaged to identify PM targets as cues for intention fulfillment. Similarly, the two-process model 
of strategic monitoring (2PSM; Guynn, 2003; see also Horn & Bayen, 2015, for a recent model-
based test of this theory) suggests that controlled processing is required to actively maintain the 
intention and to regularly check the environment for PM targets. Finally, the multiprocess theory 
(MPT; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel, Umanath, Einstein, & Waldum, 2015) assumes 
some controlled attentional monitoring of the environment for PM targets, but also that PM can 
sometimes rely on spontaneous processes that are not attention demanding (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2015). That is, when PM targets fall naturally in the focus of 
attention while performing an ongoing task (i.e., focal PM targets), the PM targets will be 
spontaneously noticed, even without engagement in attentional monitoring (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 2005; Harrison & Einstein, 2010); note, however, that some evidence indicates that 
even PM tasks that comprise focal targets elicit some levels of attentional monitoring (Harrison, 
Mullet, Whiffen, Ousterhout, & Einstein, 2014; Smith, Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007). A 
recent extension of MPT has further emphasized the role of attentional monitoring by assuming 
that a spontaneous PM-retrieval encounter can subsequently initiate attentional monitoring 
(Scullin, McDaniel, & Shelton, 2013). In line with the assumption that executive attentional 
processes underlie PM performance, Schnitzspahn, Stahl, Zeintl, Kaller, and Kliegel 
(2013) showed that individual differences in executive control (i.e., inhibition and shifting) are 
associated with age-related PM declines and predict PM performance (see also Zuber, Kliegel, & 
Ihle, 2016). 
In sum, the conceptualization of attentional PM processes differs across theories, but all current 
views generally agree that PM must often rely on attentional processing. In line with this 
assumption, considerable evidence demonstrates that holding a (nonfocal) PM intention slows 
ongoing-task responses compared to performing the ongoing task alone (e.g., A.-L. Cohen, 
Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Smith, 2003). This 
robust finding has been termed the PM-induced interference or cost effect (Hicks et al., 
2005; Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003) and is usually interpreted as evidence that attentional 
processes are recruited for PM processing at a cost to performing one’s ongoing tasks (but 
see Heathcote, Loft, & Remington, 2015). 
Whereas PM-induced costs indicate that participants sacrifice their ongoing-task processing to 
some extent in order to maintain the PM task, they do not necessarily imply that this is the only 
strategy that people use to avoid PM failures. In fact, people may solve the problem of balancing 
PM and ongoing-task performance in a number of ways: for example, by adhering to contextual 
or stimulus-specific information that is indicative of PM target occurrence (A. L. Cohen, Jaudas, 
Hirschhorn, Sobin, & Gollwitzer, 2012; Kuhlmann & Rummel, 2014; Lourenço, White, & 
Maylor, 2013; Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006) or by strategically allocating additional attention 
away from the ongoing task to the PM task due to actual (Hicks et al., 2005) or anticipated 
(Boywitt & Rummel, 2012; Lourenço, Hill, & Maylor, 2015; Rummel & Meiser, 2013) PM 
demands. In the present research, we go a step further by arguing that people holding an 
intention do not simply strategically distribute their attention between their ongoing and PM 
tasks. Additionally, they also focus more on the entire PM/ongoing-task ensemble and thus 
engage less in thoughts that are unrelated to their current tasks in order to allow for performing 
both tasks. 
TUTs and Their Relation to PM  
Extensive laboratory research demonstrates that people experience TUTs frequently while 
performing a broad range of cognitive tasks (McVay & Kane, 2010; Mooneyham & Schooler, 
2013; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). TUTs are typically assessed 
via the unpredictable presentation of thought probes throughout ongoing tasks, and these elicited 
TUT reports have been validated, in part, by correspondences to objective measures, such as 
executive-control errors, extreme response times (RTs; and modeled parameters thereof), eye-
movement and blinking patterns, and neuroimaging signatures (e.g., Baird, Smallwood, Lutz, & 
Schooler, 2014; Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Frank, Nara, 
Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; Kucyi & Davis, 2014; McVay & Kane, 2012a; Reichle, 
Reineberg, & Schooler, 2010; Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). 
TUTs might be more or less functional for the individual in the long run (Klinger, 
2013; McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), but they clearly 
interfere with performance of concurrent tasks. Disengagement from TUTs also appears to be 
under some degree of willful control, as subjects with stronger cognitive abilities tend to mind-
wander less during demanding tasks than do those with weaker abilities (e.g., Kane et al., 
2016; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012b; Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014; Unsworth & McMillan, 
2013, 2014). Furthermore, TUT rates also tend to change with context: When current cognitive 
tasks become more complex, fewer TUTs are observed (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 
1966; Kane et al., 2007; Randall et al., 2014; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Teasdale et al., 
1995; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993). 
Importantly, a controlled disengagement from mind wandering offers an additional degree of 
freedom for the adjustment of attentional processing within the PM/ongoing-task ensemble. On 
the one hand, people holding a PM intention could engage in attentional PM processing at a cost 
to their ongoing task, as argued by existing PM theories (Einstein & McDaniel, 2010; Smith, 
2010) and shown in previous studies (Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). On the other hand, they 
could also decide to engage more in PM-task related thoughts instead of allowing their minds to 
wander. That is, in the light of additional demands from the PM task, people may decide to focus 
to a greater extent on the current complement of tasks. This latter idea has not yet been 
systematically tested so far, but Marsh, Hicks, and Cook (2005) raised a similar idea in their 
General Discussion section; namely, that people likely engage in stimulus-independent thoughts 
in addition to thoughts about the PM/ongoing-task set. Drawing from this idea, Cook, Rummel, 
and Dummel (2015) recently suggested that reward-induced PM improvements without a 
concomitant increase in PM-induced costs might be caused by the reward motivating participants 
to focus more on the overall PM/ongoing-task ensemble. Therefore, in the present research we 
assessed participants’ thought content while they performed an ongoing task with or without an 
embedded PM task to test whether the addition of a PM task would affect TUT engagement. 
To our best knowledge, only two previous studies have investigated participants’ thought content 
while performing a laboratory PM/ongoing-task ensemble (but see Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007, 
for a collection of thought self-reports in a naturalistic PM setting). Anderson and Einstein 
(2016) collected open thought report in a task participants performed after the PM task was 
finished and found that the presentation of PM targets in this task still triggered PM-related 
thoughts. This finding suggests that the PM intention was not completely deactivated but does 
not address the present question of whether an active PM intention changes the engagement in 
TUTs. Reese and Cherry (2002) had older and younger adults perform a short-term memory 
(STM) task. On each trial, participants saw 4–9 words for immediate recall. Furthermore, as a 
PM task, they had to press a special key in response to one specific target word. TUTs (i.e., 
thoughts that did not refer to either task) were assessed while participants performed the ongoing 
task by asking them to classify their thoughts as being off- or on-task and further report on them. 
Younger adults reported higher TUT rates than did older adults, but PM-related thoughts did not 
predict PM performance. However, as this study focused primarily on age differences, the 
investigators did not include a control group in their design that performed the ongoing task 
alone. Therefore, their study also does not speak to whether participants’ on-task focus changes 
with the addition of a PM task to an ongoing task. 
Like Reese and Cherry (2002), we consider thoughts about a PM task within an ongoing-task 
context, in which the PM intention might have to be executed, as “task-related thoughts” because 
these thoughts directly refer to one of the task goals in the current context. According to the 
executive-failure view of mind wandering (Kane & McVay, 2012), TUTs are conceptualized as 
thoughts that interfere with current task goals and thus PM-task thoughts would not be 
considered TUTs according to this view (see the General Discussion section for alternative 
views). This conceptualization also jibes with views from the PM literature, that maintaining a 
PM intention becomes an integral part of the ongoing-task processing. For example, Smith 
(2010) argues that people continuously engage in preparatory PM processing as part of their 
regular ongoing-task processing, in order to retrieve the PM intention at the appropriate moment. 
Similarly, Guynn (2003) argues that people with pending intentions will put themselves in a 
retrieval mode while performing their ongoing task. Note, however, that considering PM-related 
thoughts as task-related does not necessarily contradict the alternative view that intention 
retrieval can occur spontaneously and is stimulus driven (McDaniel et al., 2015; Scullin et al., 
2013). Although such views would probably predict PM-related thoughts to occur rather 
infrequently in the absence of a PM target, they do not deny that the PM-task goal may be 
reactivated and conscious from time to time. 
Others have argued that thoughts about a PM intention, which occur while performing an 
ongoing task, can be considered a distinct form of goal-driven mind-wandering (A.-L. Cohen, 
2013). Although we believe that any conscious thought about an active (i.e., potentially relevant) 
task goal should rather be classified as task-related than as task-unrelated, we generally 
sympathize with the consideration of PM-related thoughts as being distinct from both task-
unrelated mind wandering and (ongoing-) task-related thoughts. Therefore, we combined a 
forced-choice thought probe procedure with additional open reports in order to subdivide the 
task-related thoughts as explicitly ongoing task or PM task related. We describe this procedure in 
the following section. 
General Method 
 
We conducted three experiments to test our hypothesis that people holding an intention will not 
only sacrifice their ongoing-task performance in favor of the PM task, but will also increase their 
conscious on-task focus. 
In all experiments, we presented groups of subjects (in the PM conditions) with a typical 
PM/ongoing-task ensemble, using a lexical-decision task as the ongoing task, and the intention to 
respond to members of the animal category or to specific words with a special key, as the PM 
task. Another group (no-PM condition) performed the ongoing task alone. From time to time, we 
asked subjects of all groups to report on their thought contents. For this purpose, we used binary 
forced-choice thought probes that asked subjects to indicate whether their immediately preceding 
thoughts had been on task or off task (with instructions to consider thoughts about the ongoing 
task or PM task to be “on task”). We paired these forced-choice probes with subsequent open 
thought reports. In doing so, we were able to assess thought contents and classify them as either 
ongoing-task related, PM-task related, or task unrelated without explicitly reminding participants 
of the PM task (cf., Reese & Cherry, 2002). By comparing thought contents between PM and no-
PM conditions, we aimed to evaluate how the addition of a PM task to an ongoing task changes 
the engagement in on-task and off-task thoughts. Furthermore, by comparing ongoing-task 
performances under PM and no-PM conditions, we aimed to replicate the PM-induced costs 
effect (Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). Finally, we applied the ex-Gaussian model to the 
ongoing-task RT data. According to previous research, this approach can be useful to 
differentiate between more sustained and more transient PM-induced cost effects, because the 
former should be reflected by changes in the μ and the latter by changes in the τ parameter of the 
model (Abney, McBride, & Petrella, 2013; Ball, Brewer, Loft, & Bowden, 2015; Brewer, 
2011; Loft, Bowden, Ball, & Brewer, 2014). Inasmuch as participants continuously maintain 
their PM intentions (Guynn, 2003; Smith, 2003, 2010), we would expect to observe PM-related 
changes in μ, whereas more periodical checking (Guynn, 2003; Scullin et al., 2013) should be 
reflected by PM-related changes in τ. That is, we expected the ex-Gaussian parameters to be 
informative regarding the relation between ongoing task and PM processing. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of the first experiment was to test whether holding a PM intention results in attentional 
costs to an ongoing task and also in a disengagement from TUTs and thus in a stronger on-task 
conscious focus. Across subsequent Method and Results sections, we report how we determined 
our sample size and all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and four university students (19–36 years, Mage = 22; 78% female), who were all 
native speakers of German, participated for course credit or payment. Sample size was 
determined with the software G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to detect 
medium-sized effects (d = .5) in the predicted direction with good statistical power (i.e., 1 − ß < 
.80). We excluded the data from one subject from all analyses who never pressed the PM key 
and was unable to recall the PM task at the end of the experiment. 
We randomly assigned subjects to one of two experimental groups. One group performed the 
ongoing task alone (no-PM condition; n = 51); the other performed the ongoing task while 
additionally holding a PM intention (PM condition; n = 52). 
Materials and procedure 
For the ongoing lexical-decision task, we selected 316 words of medium frequency and length 
from a German word norm database (Heister et al., 2011). We converted half the words to 
nonwords by swapping 2–4 letters. For the PM task, we selected the German words for the 
animal names, “sheep,” “zebra,” “rabbit,” “elk,” “giraffe,” “elephant,” “goat,” and “badger” as 
PM targets. These were the only animal names that appeared during the task. 
The experiment started with instructions for the ongoing lexical-decision task, to press the J-key 
for words and the F-key for nonwords as quickly and as accurately as possible. Subjects then 
practiced with 20 trials (half words, half nonwords; randomly intermixed). On each practice trial, 
subjects saw a fixation cross of varying duration (250–750 ms) followed by a letter string that 
was either a word or nonword. Letter strings remained on the screen until response. After a 500-
ms interstimulus interval, subjects received performance feedback on accuracy and speed. After 
this practice phase, we provided PM-task subjects with the additional PM instructions to press 
the hyphen key on a QWERTZ keyboard (which is at the same location as the “/” key on a 
QWERTY keyboard), instead of the J-key, for any animal names they saw in the lexical-decision 
task. We also informed subjects that pressing the PM key after having pressed an ongoing-task 
response key first would still count as an accurate PM response. 
Next, we presented thought-report instructions to all subjects. We first told subjects that we were 
interested in the thoughts that people have while performing cognitive tasks and that we would 
ask them about their current thoughts on several occasions during the lexical-decision task. 
Subjects learned that thought probes would be presented in white font on a green screen and that 
they should report only on their thoughts occurring in the instant before the thought probe 
appeared (i.e., just before the screen turned green). To increase compliance and reduce subjective 
bias, we told subjects that it is common that thoughts are sometimes on task and sometimes off 
task, and that they should respond honestly (Vinski & Watter, 2012). Note that we explicitly 
instructed subjects in the PM condition that thoughts about the additional PM task should be 
considered as being “on task” (see also Reese & Cherry, 2002). 
For illustration purposes, all subjects then performed another four ongoing-task practice trials 
(half word, half nonword; without performance feedback) with a thought-probe trial embedded 
after the second trial. Thought-probe trials comprised two questions—a forced-choice thought 
probe followed by an open thought report. Forced-choice probes presented the question, “What 
were you thinking in the previous moment?” in white font on a green background. Subjects 
chose between two options presented on-screen: (1) I thought about the task(s) I just performed, 
or (2) I thought about other stuff, which had nothing to do with the task(s) I just performed, using 
the numbers 1 and 2 on the number pad. Note that we did not mention the PM task in the thought 
probes, in order to not remind subject of the additional PM intention throughout the task. 
However, in the PM condition, thought probes always used the plural “tasks” to avoid any 
confusion regarding whether thoughts concerning the PM task should be considered on task. 
Independent of the selected answer, forced-choice probes were always followed by an open 
thought report. Open reports asked subjects to, “Please describe the exact content of the thoughts 
you had just before the screen turned green,” and presented a text box in which subjects could 
type their responses without any constraints. 
Next, all subjects solved simple math problems for 4 min to delay the PM intention for the PM 
condition. After this filler task, subjects performed 304 trials of the ongoing lexical-decision task 
(without performance feedback). We segmented the ongoing task into four blocks of 76 trials 
each, but this segmentation was imperceptible to subjects. Each block comprised 37 words, 37 
nonwords (randomly intermixed) and two animal names (PM targets). Both conditions presented 
animal names at Trials 43, 67, 100, 134, 180, 219, 252, and 276, but they functioned as PM 
targets only in the PM condition. PM trial positions were randomly determined, while ensuring 
that there were at least 20 neutral ongoing-task trials between two subsequent PM trials. In total, 
13 thought-probe trials (see description above) appeared during the ongoing task at fixed 
positions, with a spacing of at least 10 trials between subsequent probes (i.e., after Trials 19, 33, 
47, 85, 109, 143, 166, 185, 204, 237, 261, 280, and 294). After the ongoing task, we probed PM-
condition subjects’ memory for the PM key and the PM target category. Finally, all subjects 
completed a basic demographic questionnaire before being debriefed and dismissed. 
Results 
We set an alpha level of .05 for all analyses. 
PM performance 
The PM performance measure was the proportion of accurate responses to the PM targets (i.e., 
animal names in the PM condition). We considered immediate PM-key presses to a PM target, or 
PM-key presses at any time between the PM target onset and the offset of the following lexical-
decision stimulus, to be accurate PM responses. PM performance was quite good (M = .74; SD = 
.28; Table 1). False PM responses to ongoing task stimuli were rare (M = .003; SD = .006) and 
were thus not further considered. 
 
Table 1. Mean (Standard Deviation) PM Performance and Ongoing-Task Performance of 
Experiments 1 and 2 
 PM performance OT accuracy rates OT word MRTs OT nonword MRTs 
Experimental 
condition 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Experiment 1 
No PM  .93(.04) 655(102) 735(127) 
PM .74(.28) .94(.03) 738(113) 807(144) 
Experiment 2 
No-PM  .93(.06) .93(.05) 644(112) 625(101) 743(181) 706(133) 
High demands  .35(.37) .94(.03) .93(.04) 702(128) 673(117) 803(183) 751(158) 
Low demands  .77(.27) .94(.04) .94(.04) 707(146) 667(112) 825(214) 763(141) 
Experiment 3 
No PM  .93(.04) .93(.04) 633(113) 620(104) 707(151) 690(137) 
No-reward  .43(.40) .95(.04) .94(.03) 669(94) 653(89) 767(129) 725(112) 
PM  
Reward PM  .71(.37) .95(.03) .94(.04) 672(106) 671(102) 758(142) 742(130) 
Note. PM = prospective memory; OT = ongoing task; MRTs = mean response times in 
milliseconds. In the PM condition of Experiment 1, eight PM targets occurred in the course of 
the ongoing task. In the PM conditions of Experiments 2 and 3, the ongoing task was divided 
into two phases. Phase 1 comprises the first half of ongoing-task trials where no-PM targets 
occurred; Phase 2 comprises the second half of ongoing trials with four embedded PM targets. 
Ongoing-task performance 
We used ongoing-task accuracy rates and RTs (in milliseconds) to assess ongoing-task 
performance (see Table 1 for means in both conditions). PM trials, as well as their analogous 
trials in the no-PM control condition, were discarded from the ongoing-task analyses. As in 
previous studies, lexical-decision accuracy was not affected by the presence versus absence of an 
additional PM intention, t(101) = 1.36, p = .177, d = .28. 
For RT analyses, we included only ongoing-task trials with accurate responses. We also 
discarded RTs on the two trials following a PM target trial or a thought probe, to control for task-
switching costs potentially associated with these trials (cf., Brewer, 2011; Meier & Rey-Mermet, 
2012). As in our previous studies, we trimmed RTs separately for words and nonwords, retaining 
for analyses only RTs slower than 300 ms and faster than two standard deviations above the 
individual subject’s mean. As PM targets were always words, word RTs should better reflect PM 
processes (Brewer, 2011; A. L. Cohen et al., 2012) and so we focused analyses on word RTs. 
Including nonword RTs as an additional factor level, however, yielded the same pattern of 
results. 
Subjects made significantly faster lexical decisions in the no-PM control condition than in the 
PM condition, t(101) = 3.89, p < .001, d = .77. Thus, as in previous studies (Marsh et al., 
2003; Smith, 2003), the additional PM intention interfered with ongoing-task RTs. To further 
investigate the nature of PM-induced costs, we modeled the word RT distributions separately for 
both experimental conditions using an ex-Gaussian analysis. Table 2 presents the mean 
parameter estimates from theses analyses. In line with several previous studies (Abney et al., 
2013; Loft et al., 2014; McBride & Abney, 2012), the RT differences between the no-PM and the 
PM condition were reflected by differences in the μ parameter, t(101) = 3.97, p < .001, d = .77 
and the τ parameter, t(101) = 2.18, p = .032, d = .43 (but see Brewer, 2011, for an isolated effect 
on tau). Further, there was a nonsignificant trend for a difference in the σ parameter, t(101) = 
1.96, p = .053, d = .39. 
 
Table 2. Mean (Standard Deviation) Ex-Gaussian Parameter Estimates and Thought Rates 
(Assessed Via Forced-Choice Probes) 
 μ σ τ TUT rates 
Experimental 
condition 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Experiment 1 
No PM 525(58) .93(.04) 655(102) 735(127) 
PM 572(63) .94(.03) 738(113) 807(144) 
Experiment 2 
No-PM 537(64) 527(63) 60(29) 52(36) 110(68) 103(75) .36(.21) .38(.24) 
High demands 566(71) 556(85) 70(41) 65(59) 142(86) 118(75) .27(.23) .30(.23) 
Low demands 550(66) 532(60) 61(41) 52(32) 159(120) 137(80) .27(.22) .30(.21) 
Experiment 3 
No PM 529(64) 520(64) 46(35) 49(34) 110(77) 102(66) .31(.21) .40(.25) 
No-reward 559(68) 535(52) 62(41) 51(40) 116(70) 125(76) .26(.22) .30(.24) 
Reward PM 569(72) 569(79) 65(36) 57(42) 108(76) 106(68) .14(.18) .25(.21) 
Note. PM = prospective memory; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts. Phase 1 comprises the first 
half of ongoing-task trials of Experiment 2 where no-PM targets occurred; Phase 2 comprises the 
second half of ongoing trials with four embedded PM targets. 
Task-unrelated thoughts 
We assessed TUTs in two ways, via forced-choice and via open thought reports. Table 2 presents 
the mean TUT rates assessed via forced-choice probes in the two experimental conditions. As the 
forced-choice probes had a binary format (on-task, off-task thoughts), we calculated TUT rates 
by dividing the number of off-task responses by the total number of responses. Subjects reported 
significantly higher TUT rates in the no-PM (M = .32; SD = .20) than in the PM condition (M = 
.23; SD = .20), t(101) = 2.12, p = .037, d = .40, indicating that engagement in TUTs decreases 
when holding a PM intention. Open thought reports were coded by two independent raters, 
blinded to the hypothesis and experimental conditions. The raters were given a list of all the 
reported thought contents (13 per subject), without any identifying information. The raters 
decided for each thought whether it was generally task-related or not. They were then asked to 
code each thought content into one of four categories—ongoing-task related, PM-task related, 
unspecifically task related, or task unrelated. The first category, ongoing-task related, was 
assigned to thought contents that were clearly about the ongoing lexical-decision task, such as 
“Was the last string a word?” or “Damn, I miss-classified the word ‘concrete.’” The second 
category, PM-task related, was assigned to thought responses that were clearly about the PM 
task, such as “Finally, there was an animal word” or “ZEBRA, strike!” The third category, 
unspecifically task related, was used for responses that were definitely on task, but it was unclear 
whether they were about the ongoing lexical-decision task or the PM task, specifically. For 
example, we classified responses such as these as unspecifically task related, “Pressing the 
wrong key nearly feels like a slap in the face” or “I have to concentrate more.” The fourth and 
final category, task unrelated, was used for thoughts that were clearly off task, such as “I was 
thinking about the guy who is cheating on my friend” or “I should learn more about politics.” 
Because the raters were condition blinded, on-task thoughts could be classified as being 
unspecifically-task-related in the no-PM control condition; we later reclassified these as 
ongoing-task related. Only few thoughts did not fit into one of the four categories and they 
remained unclassified (0.8% of all ratings). We calculated Cohen’s kappa (J. Cohen, 1960) to 
assess interrater reliability, κ = .80, SE = .01, p < .001. According to Altman (1991), κ > .60 
indicates a high level of agreement between raters and so our interrater reliability was good. 
Whenever the raters disagreed, the first author (while blinded to condition) decided which rating 
was more appropriate. Figure 1 displays the mean proportions of on-task and off-task thoughts 
by open thought reports. An independent samples t test for off-task open-reports revealed 
significantly higher TUT engagement in the no-PM condition (M = .39; SD = .23) than in the PM 
condition, (M = .28; SD = .21), t(101) = 2.47, p = .015, d = .49. Thus, the open-thought-report 
results mirrored the forced-choice-probe results. We finally note that in the PM condition, the 
proportion of thoughts classified as PM-related was significantly higher than zero, t(51) = 
8.06, p < .001, d = .63, indicating that, for those individuals holding a PM intention, a substantial 
amount of conscious thinking was focused on the PM task. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts assessed via open thought 
reports in Experiment 1. In the prospective memory (PM) condition, task-related thoughts were 
further classified as being ongoing-task (OT) related, unspecifically task related, or PM related. 
Discussion 
In line with previous research (e.g., A.-L. Cohen et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003), 
we found substantial PM-induced costs in terms of slower ongoing-task responses in the 
presence versus absence of a PM intention. Ex-Gaussian modeling further showed that the μ and 
τ parameters best reflected PM-induced changes in response speed (Abney et al., 2013; Loft et 
al., 2014). Acknowledging that ex-Gaussian parameters do not necessarily map cleanly onto 
underlying processes (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009), Loft et al. argued that PM-induced costs 
have a rather continuous component (increase in μ) as well as a more transient (increase in τ) 
component and that these two components reflect different types of attentional PM processing. 
Whereas changes in μ may reflect continuous monitoring, changes in τ may reflect periodical 
reactivations of the intention (cf., Guynn, 2003). If so, both types of attentional processes may 
have been recruited by our participants to perform the present PM task. We will further discuss 
implications of the ex-Gaussian modeling results in the General Discussion section. 
Our thought-probe results further indicate that the PM intention not only interfered with 
ongoing-task processing but also led to a reduction in TUTs. Open-thought-report results further 
corroborated that holding a PM intention reduces TUTs. In the context of substantial rates of PM 
thoughts and PM-induced slowing to the ongoing task, we conclude that people who hold a PM 
intention tend to engage in PM processing that comes at a cost to their ongoing task. Critically, 
however, they also tend to focus more on the entire PM/ongoing-task ensemble (as indexed by 
fewer TUTs)—probably, in part, via conscious thinking about the PM goal. 
We must note one alternative interpretation for the present findings, however. Perhaps the 
increase in PM-task-related thoughts was not due to a proactive engagement in PM processing, 
but rather to a reactive activation of PM-task-related thoughts caused by the presentation of PM 
targets in the course of the ongoing task (cf., Scullin et al., 2013). To rule out this alternative 
explanation, Experiment 2 included a task condition in which PM targets did not occur until the 
second half of the ongoing-task phase. Further aims of Experiment 2 were to replicate the 
Experiment 1 findings and to extend them to another PM task that imposed lower attentional 
demands. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 comprised three between-subjects conditions: two PM conditions and a no-PM 
control condition. In one PM condition, subjects responded to any members of a particular 
semantic category with the PM key (as in Experiment 1). Because the PM targets are not well 
specified in this PM task (i.e., subjects do not know which exemplars to expect), target detection 
requires a category decision in addition to the word/nonword decision required for performing 
the ongoing task. Because of these extra processing requirements, this task is considered to be 
“nonfocal” to the ongoing task and thus rather demanding (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Knight 
et al., 2011; Marsh et al., 2003). In the other PM condition, subjects received two specific words 
as PM targets. Because two words are relatively easily to actively maintain in working memory, 
and especially because identifying these words does not interfere with making lexical decisions 
(A.-L. Cohen et al., 2008), this PM task can be considered “focal” to the ongoing task. It should 
therefore impose little attentional demand on subjects (Marsh et al., 2003; Rummel, Kuhlmann, 
& Touron, 2013). Based on previous research, we expected less continuous monitoring (and an 
attendant decrease in μ) in the low- versus the high-demands condition. We were further 
interested in whether the PM-task-induced reduction in TUTs observed in the first experiment 
would also be influenced by variation in task demands across these PM conditions. Finally, we 
also aimed to rule out the alternative explanation, that the reduction in TUTs observed in the 
Experiment-1 PM condition was due to a reactive effect of PM targets triggering PM-task-related 
thoughts. For this purpose, we did not present any PM targets during the first half of the ongoing 
task. We could therefore test, in the absence of PM target cues, whether PM-related thoughts 
would still occur at substantial rates and whether TUTs would still be reduced in the PM 
conditions versus the control condition. 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred forty-one students (17–51 years, mean age = 22; 82% female), who were all native 
speakers of German, participated for course credit or monetary compensation. We aimed to 
collect data from 159 subjects in order to test for medium-sized (f = .25) group differences with a 
statistical power of .80, but we were forced to stop data collection at the end of the semester. 
Therefore, the achieved power for medium-sized group differences was satisfactory but lower 
than targeted (i.e., 1 − ß = .74). We excluded from analyses one participant who did not follow 
task instructions, and two subjects who never pressed the PM key and were additionally unable 
to recall the PM task at the end of the experiment. 
We randomly assigned subjects to one of three experimental groups. Subjects in the no-PM 
condition performed the ongoing task alone (n = 48). Those in the high-demand PM condition 
performed the ongoing task and pressed the PM key for members of the animal category (n = 
44). Finally, subjects in the low-demand PM condition performed the ongoing task and pressed 
the PM key for two specific words (n = 46). In both PM conditions, PM targets appeared only in 
the second half of the ongoing-task phase. Therefore, we had a 3 (condition) × 2 (task phase) 
mixed design. The statistical power to detect a medium-sized interaction between condition and 
task phase was very good, 1 − ß > .99. 
Materials and procedure 
Materials and procedure mirrored Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. In addition to the 
no-PM condition and the (high-demand) PM condition that used animal names as PM targets, a 
(low-demand) PM condition required participants to press the PM key in response to either of 
two specific words (i.e., the German words for “sheep” and “crown”). Furthermore, PM targets 
did not appear during the first two blocks (of four) of the ongoing task. Instead, four new words 
from the same word database were presented. This allowed us to investigate whether on-task 
thought rates would be higher for those individuals who hold a PM intention, as in Experiment 1, 
even during a task phase where thoughts are not cued by the prior occurrence of PM targets. In 
both PM conditions here, then, only Trials 180, 219, 252, and 276 presented PM targets. Thought 
probes occurred at the same positions as in Experiment 1. For analyses, we considered the first 
two ongoing-task blocks as Phase 1 (i.e., phase without PM-target presentation) and the second 
two blocks as Phase 2 (i.e., phase with PM-target presentation). 
Results 
Prospective-memory performance 
PM performance was worse in the high (M = .35; SD = .37) than in the low-demand PM 
condition (M = .77; SD = .27), t(88) = 6.15, p < .001, d = 1.30, indicating a successful 
manipulation of PM task demands. Notably, PM performance in the high-demand condition was 
substantially worse than in Experiment 1, which used the same PM-task instructions. Experiment 
2 presented the first PM target quite late in the course of the ongoing task and it presented only 
four (rather than 8) PM targets. Prior empirical evidence suggests that both delayed presentation 
of the first target (Martin, Brown, & Hicks, 2011; McBride, Beckner, & Abney, 2011) and 
infrequent target occurrence (Czernochowski, Horn, & Bayen, 2012) hamper PM performance, 
and so this likely explains the lower PM performance with category targets in Experiment 2 
versus Experiment 1. False PM responses were not considered because they were rare (M = 
.001; SD = .002) and did not vary between the two PM groups, t < 1. 
Ongoing-task performance 
Table 1 presents the mean ongoing-task accuracy rates and RTs. A 3 × 2 mixed-factorial analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with the between-subjects factor condition (no-PM, high-demand PM, 
low-demand PM) and the within-subjects factor task phase (first, second) for ongoing-task 
accuracy did not indicate a significant main effect or interaction, with all Fs < 1. 
The same 3 × 2 ANOVA for word RTs (trimmed as in Experiment 1, and for each task phase 
separately) indicated that subjects were significantly slower in the first (M = 683; SD = 132) than 
in the second phase (M = 654; SD = 111), F(1, 135) = 46.36, p < .001, f = 0.43. This finding may 
reflect a general ongoing-task practice effect but could be also be due to the fact that PM costs 
decrease over time, especially when no targets occur (Loft, Kearney, & Remington, 2008). 
However, because the interaction with condition was not significant, F(2, 135) = 2.13, p = 
.123, f = 0.18, there was no evidence for a stronger decrease in RTs in the PM than in the no-PM 
conditions, rendering the practice-effect explanation more likely. There was a significant main 
effect of condition, F(2, 135) = 3.17, p = .045, f = 0.22. Pairwise comparisons indicated that RTs 
were faster in the no-PM condition (M = 634; SD= 105) than in either the high-demand (M = 
687; SD = 120) or low-demand PM condition (M = 687; SD = 126), both ps < .05. RTs in the two 
PM conditions did not differ, p = .981. 
We submitted the three ex-Gaussian parameters to the same 3 × 2 ANOVA (see Table 2 for 
mean estimates). For the parameter μ, this analysis indicated a main (practice) effect of task 
phase, F(1, 135) = 7.56, p = .007, f = 0.24, that was not further qualified by an interaction, F < 1. 
Further, there was a nonsignificant trend of condition, F(2, 135) = 2.48, p = .088, f = 0.19. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the μ-parameter estimates were lower in the no-PM (M = 
561; SD = 58) than in the high-demand PM condition (M = 561; SD = 72), p = .030, which is in 
line with the findings of Experiment 1. However, μ-parameter estimates in the no-PM condition 
did not differ from those in the low-demand PM condition (M = 541; SD = 59), p = .49; the two-
PM condition also did not differ, p = .139. We found no effects or trends for the σ parameter 
(all Fs < 2.50; all ps > .120). For the τ parameter, there was a main effect of task phase, F(1, 135) 
= 7.98, p = .005, f = 0.24, and no interaction, F < 1, but a main effect of condition, F(2, 135) = 
3.35, p = .038, f = 0.22. Pairwise comparisons further showed that the τ parameter was lower in 
the no-PM (M = 107; SD = 65) than in the low-demand PM condition (M = 148; SD = 71), p = 
.011. The τ parameter in the high-demand PM condition (M = 141; SD = 93) did not differ from 
either the no-PM condition, p = .155, or the low-demand PM condition, p = .269. 
Task-unrelated thoughts 
Table 2 displays mean TUT rates, assessed via forced-choice probes, in the three experimental 
conditions. 
Again, we conducted a 3 × 2 ANOVA with the between-subjects factor, condition (no-PM, high-
demands PM, low-demands PM), and the within-subjects factor, task phase (first, second), for 
TUT rates. Despite high power, this analysis did not reveal a main effect of task phase, F(1, 135) 
= 2.15, p = .145, f = 0.13, or an interaction between condition and task phase, F < 1. However, 
there was a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 135) = 3.23, p = .043, f = 0.22. Pairwise 
comparisons further showed that the TUT rates were significantly higher in the no-PM condition 
(M = .37; SD = .19) than in both the high-demand (M = .28; SD = .19), p = .029, and the low-
demand PM conditions (M = .29; SD = .18), p = .033. The two PM conditions did not differ in 
TUT rates, p = .947. This finding replicates the results of Experiment 1 and provides further 
support for the idea that the likelihood of thoughts being off task decreases in the presence of a 
pending intention. Importantly, TUTs decreased for both the high-demand and the low-demand 
PM condition to a similar extend. 
The same two raters as in Experiment 1 coded the open thought contents. Interrater reliability 
was again good, κ = .80, SE = .01, p < .001 (Altman, 1991). The first author adjudicated between 
discrepant ratings. Only a few thoughts were coded as unclassifiable (1.2% of all ratings). The 
open-report results were similar to those of the forced-choice probes. Figure 2 displays the 
means across conditions. 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts assessed via open thought 
reports in Experiment 2. Phase 1 = task phase without PM targets; Phase 2 = task phase with 
prospective memory (PM) targets. In the two PM conditions, task-related thoughts were further 
classified as being ongoing-task (OT) related, unspecifically task related, or PM related. 
The 3 × 2 ANOVA for open-report TUT rates showed a trending effect of task phase, F(1, 135) 
= 3.51, p = .063, f = 0.16, but no interaction, F < 1. Importantly, there was a main effect of 
condition, F(2, 135) = 3.46, p = .034, f = 0.22, replicating the findings from the forced-choice 
probes. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that open-report TUT rates in the no-PM 
condition (M = .38; SD = .20) were significantly higher than in the high-demand PM condition 
(M = .29; SD = .20), p = .012, but only marginally higher than in the low-demand PM condition 
(M = .32; SD = .18), p = .075; again, the two PM conditions did not differ, p = .442. 
The proportions of thoughts classified as explicitly PM-task related were significantly higher 
than zero in each block of both PM conditions, all ts > 5.00, ps < .001 and increased from the 
first (M = .16; SD = .16) to the second block (M = .26; SD = .22), t(89) = 4.92, p < .001, d = 0.97. 
Thus, subjects holding a PM intention—regardless of the PM task demands and even in the 
absence of PM targets—experienced a substantial rate of conscious thoughts about the PM 
intention but more so in the presence of PM targets. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the central findings of Experiment 1, that people not only maintain 
pending intentions at a processing cost to their ongoing task, but that they also disengage from 
TUTs in order to focus more on their intentions. Importantly, despite the very good statistical 
power for the interaction test, there was no evidence that the reliable condition differences in 
reported TUTs changed from the first to the second ongoing-task phase (i.e., there was no 
interaction of condition with task phase). Therefore, it seems unlikely that the decrease in TUTs 
observed in Experiment 1 resulted from a reactive increase in PM-task-related thoughts after PM 
target presentation. However, the increase of open-report thoughts that were rated as being 
explicitly PM-task related from the first to the second task phase also indicates that the 
presentation of PM targets may trigger some additional conscious PM thoughts (cf., Anderson & 
Einstein, 2016; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). Interestingly, the strength of the general on-task 
focus did not vary between the two PM-task conditions, perhaps because subjects were not 
consciously aware of the actual demands until late in the task (i.e., not until after they had 
experienced the first PM target; see Rummel & Meiser, 2013). In line with this finding, the 
mean-RT results also suggest that subjects in Experiment 2 were not sensitive to the variation of 
PM task demands. However, ex-Gaussian modeling results suggest that attentional PM 
processing might have been of different quality in the two PM conditions. Whereas the 
significant increase in the parameter μ in the high-demand PM condition may reflect a more 
continuous monitoring process (Loft et al., 2014), the increase in the parameter τ in the low-
demand PM condition monitoring may reflect a more transient attentional process (e.g., more 
periodically target checking; Ball et al., 2015). Notably, in Experiment 1 we observed PM-
induced changes in both μ and τ with the more demanding PM task. This might have been due to 
the more frequent presentation of PM targets that may have encouraged subjects to engage in 
more periodical target checking. Further research varying PM-task demands on a more fine-
grained level should further investigate this possibility. It is possible, for example, that the on-
task focus will change according to the nature of the PM task in a more idiosyncratic way, 
depending on the personal value of successful intention fulfillment (Brandimonte, Ferrante, 
Bianco, & Villani, 2010; Cook et al., 2015). In the third experiment, then, we examined whether 
subjects for whom the PM task goal had a high personal relevance would be motivated to focus 
more on the current task setting than would other subjects who held the same PM intention but 
for whom the PM task was of less personal relevance. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 comprised three between-subjects conditions: two PM conditions and a no-PM 
control condition. Both PM conditions used a categorical (nonfocal, high-demand) PM task, but 
PM performance in one condition was additionally associated with a monetary reward. Similar 
manipulations have rendered the PM task goal particularly important and thus increased 
motivation to execute the intention (Cook et al., 2015). We hypothesized that higher personal 
relevance of the PM-task goal would result in a stronger on-task focus and fewer TUTs 
compared with a condition where the PM intention comes with no additional rewards. In order to 
prevent subjects in the reward condition from sacrificing their ongoing-task performance for the 
PM-task goal, we made the reward also contingent upon ongoing-task performance. As in 
Experiment 2, we only presented PM targets in the second task phase to investigate TUTs and 
PM-related thoughts in the presence and absence of PM targets. 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred forty-nine German-speaking students (18–34 years, mean age = 23; 86% female) 
participated for monetary compensation. We excluded from analyses two participants who did 
not follow task instructions, and one who never pressed the PM key and did not remember the 
PM task in the final memory test. 
We randomly assigned subjects to one of three experimental groups. Subjects in the no-PM 
condition performed the ongoing task alone (n = 49). Those in the no-reward PM condition 
performed the ongoing task and pressed the PM key for members of the animal category (n = 
50). Subjects in the reward PM condition (n = 47) performed the same tasks as those in the no-
reward PM condition, but received additional money for every correct PM response. In both PM 
conditions, PM targets appeared only in the second half of the ongoing-task phase. Therefore, we 
had a 3 (condition) × 2 (task phase) mixed-factorial design. We determined our sample size so 
that the statistical power for medium-sized group differences in a planned comparison analysis (1 
− ß = .85) as well as for a medium-sized effect of task phase or an interaction between condition 
and task phase (1 − ß > .99) were good. 
Materials and procedure 
Materials and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2. Both PM conditions used the animal 
category as PM targets. All participants were paid 5 euros for their participation. Participants in 
the reward PM condition were informed with PM instructions that they could receive up to 2 
euros in addition when they detected all animal names and responded to them with the PM key. 
They were informed that, in case they missed some of the animal names, they would receive a 
portion of the 2 euros in accordance with the proportion of correct responses to animal names 
(see Cook et al., 2015, Exp. 2 for a similar manipulation). Furthermore, they were told that they 
would only receive the additional payment if their ongoing-task accuracy and speed would be 
average or better. In doing so, we aimed to prevent participants from sacrificing their ongoing-
task performance in order to gain higher payments but, in fact, we paid participants contingent 
on their PM performance only. Thought probes occurred at the same positions as in Experiments 




PM performance was worse in the no-reward (M = .42; SD = .40) than in the reward PM 
condition (M = .71; SD = .37), t(95) = 3.58, p = .001, d = 0.73. PM performance in the no-reward 
condition was similar to the one observed in the category PM condition of Experiment 2, 
suggesting that the rather low PM performance observed there was reliable. False PM responses 
were not considered because they were rare (M = .001; SD = .002) and did not vary between the 
two PM conditions, t < 1.2. 
Ongoing-task performance 
Table 1 shows the mean ongoing-task accuracy rates and RTs. A 3 × 2 ANOVA with the 
between-subjects factor condition (no-PM, no-reward PM, reward PM) and the within-subjects 
factor task phase (first, second) for ongoing-task accuracy did not indicate a significant main 
effect or interaction, with all Fs < 2.6, ps > .116. 
The 3 × 2 ANOVA for word RTs (trimmed as in Experiment 2) indicated that subjects were 
significantly slower in the first (M = 658; SD = 105) than in the second phase (M = 648; SD= 
100), F(1, 143) = 6.64, p = .011, f = 0.21. There was no interaction, F < 1.3, but a trending 
condition effect, F(2, 143) = 2.81, p = .064, f = 0.20. We used planned Helmert contrasts to test 
our hypotheses with maximal power (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). That is, the first contrast 
compared the no-PM with the two PM conditions to test for PM-induced effects. The second 
contrast compared the no-reward with the reward PM condition to test for additional reward-
induced effects. The Helmert contrasts revealed that participants were generally faster in the no-
PM condition than in the PM conditions, F(1, 143) = 5.37, p = .022, f = 0.19, whereas RTs in the 
two PM conditions did not differ, F < 1. 
We next submitted the three ex-Gaussian parameters to the 3 × 2 ANOVA (see Table 2 for mean 
estimates). For the parameter μ, this analysis showed a task-phase main effect, F(1, 143) = 
6.19, p = .014, f = 0.21, no interaction, F(2, 143) = 2.41, p = .093, f = 0.18, but a significant 
condition main effect, F(2, 143) = 6.12, p = .003, f = 0.29. Planned contrasts revealed that, as 
predicted with the rather demanding PM task, μ-parameter estimates were higher in the presence 
versus absence of a PM intention, F(1, 143) = 9.30, p = .003, f = 0.25. This finding is in line with 
Experiment 2. There was also a nonsignificant trend for higher μ-parameter estimates in the 
presence versus absence of a reward, F(1, 143) = 3.13, p= .079, f = 0.15. We did not find any 
significant effects for the σ estimates (all Fs < 1.70; all ps > .190) except for a trending main 
effect of condition, F(2, 143) = 2.62, p = .076, f = 0.19. Planned contrasts suggested that σ 
estimates were higher in the presence versus absence of a PM intention, F(1, 143) = 4.54, p = 
.035, f = 0.18, but unaffected by the reward manipulation, F < 1. Because we did not observe any 
effects on σ in the other two experiments, however, we did not interpret this result any further. 
For the τ parameter, we did not observe any significant main effects or interaction this time, 
all Fs < 1. This is also in line with results from Experiment 2 regarding the demanding PM 
condition. 
Task-unrelated thoughts 
Table 2 displays mean TUT rates, assessed via forced-choice probes, in the three experimental 
conditions. 
A 3 × 2 ANOVA with the between-subjects factor, condition (no-PM, no-reward PM, reward 
PM), and the within-subjects factor, task phase (first, second), for TUT rates revealed a main 
effect of task phase, F(1, 143) = 18.82, p < .001, f = 0.36, with lower TUT rates in the first (M = 
.24; SD = .22) rather than in the second (M = .32; SD = .24) phase. There was no significant 
interaction, F < 1.3, but a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 143) = 7.80, p = .001, f = 
0.33. In line with the previous experiments, planned comparisons revealed that TUTs were 
generally reduced in the presence versus absence of a PM intention, F(1, 143) = 11.71, p = 
.001, f = 0.29. Additionally, TUTs decreased further in the presence versus absence of a 
reward, F(1, 143) = 4.14, p = .044, f = 0.17. This result is the first evidence that subjects engage 
in an even stronger on-task focus when PM intention execution is of high personal value. 
Two new raters coded the open-report thought contents. An additional thought category 
(thinking about the study payment) was introduced, which should account for thoughts 
potentially induced by the reward manipulation. As such thoughts occurred very infrequently 
(<1%) we did not analyze them further. Interrater reliability was again good, κ = .82, SE = 
.01, p < .001, and the first author adjudicated between discrepant ratings. Only 2.1% of all 
ratings were unclassifiable. Figure 3 displays the means across conditions. 
 
Figure 3. Proportions of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts assessed via open thought 
reports in Experiment 3. Phase 1 = task phase without PM targets; Phase 2 = task phase with 
PM targets. In the two prospective memory (PM) conditions, task-related thoughts were further 
classified as being ongoing-task (OT) related, unspecifically task related, or PM related. 
The 3 × 2 ANOVA for open-report TUT rates showed a main effect of task phase, F(1, 143) = 
28.69, p < .001, f = 0.45, but no interaction, F < 1. Additionally, there was a main effect of 
condition, F(2, 143) = 14.20, p < .001, f = 0.45, planned contrasts further showed that TUTs 
decreased in the presence versus absence of a PM intention, F(1, 143) = 20.00, p < .001, f = 0.37 
and further decreased in the presence versus absence of a reward, F(1, 143) = 8.94, p = .003, f = 
0.25. Thus, the open-report TUT results mirrored the results from the forced-choice probes and 
replicated the results from Experiment 2 regarding the demanding PM condition. 
The proportions of thoughts classified as explicitly PM-task related were significantly higher 
than zero in each block of both PM conditions, all ts > 5.00, ps < .001 and increased from the 
first (M = .18; SD = .18) to the second block (M = .26; SD = .22), F(1, 143) = 15.00, p < .001, f = 
0.40. We did not observe more explicitly PM-related thoughts in the reward than in the no-
reward condition, F < 1.5. Thus, all subjects holding a PM intention experienced a substantial 
rate of conscious thoughts about the PM intention and, in line with Experiment 2, more so in the 
presence of PM targets. Subjects of the reward PM condition had a generally stronger on-task 
focus than those of the no-reward PM condition but did not report more explicitly PM-task-
related thoughts. It may well be, however, that differences in PM-related thoughts were present 
but not discovered because they fell in the unspecifically task-related thought category. 
Exploratory correlational analyses for Experiments 1 to 3 
We did not design our experiments to rigorously assess individual differences, and so they are 
underpowered to detect medium effects. Nonetheless, in an exploratory vein, we asked two 
theoretically inspired questions: (a) does the rate of PM-related thoughts positively predict 
ongoing-task RTs, as one would expect if monitoring was, at least in part, a conscious process?, 
and (b) does the rate of either off-task thoughts (negatively) or PM-related thoughts (positively) 
predict the accuracy of fulfilling the PM intention? Table 3 presents correlations among the 
variables of interest for the PM conditions from each experiment. With respect to our first 
question, in none of the three experiments did PM thought rate correlate with ongoing-task RTs, 
perhaps suggesting that monitoring processes are not subjectively experienced. With respect to 
our second question, in Experiment 1 and in the low PM-demand condition of Experiment 2, 
PM-target detection accuracy did not correlate with either TUT rates or PM-related thoughts (see 
also Reese & Cherry, 2002, for a similar result with a PM task that can be considered low-
demanding). However, in the high PM-demand condition from Experiment 2 and the no-reward 
condition from Experiment 3 (both presented above the diagonals in Table 3), subjects’ rate of 
PM thoughts positively predicted rate of PM accuracy (r = .57 and r = .47). Additionally, TUTs 
negatively predicted PM accuracy in the high PM-demand condition from Experiment 2 (r = 
−.39) and the no-reward (r = −.31) as well as the reward (r = −.34) conditions from Experiment 
3. These are suggestive results—potentially indicating that a stronger on-task focus, and 
conscious thoughts about more challenging and infrequently cued PM intentions, may facilitate 
their completion—but these findings require further replication in larger samples. 
 
Table 3. Correlations Among Performance and Thought-Reports in Prospective Memory 
Conditions 
Experimental conditions 1 2 3 4 5 
Experiment 1 
1. OT word MRT      
2. PM hit rate .11     
3. TUT rate (forced-
choice) 
-.01 -.11    
4. TUT rate (open 
report) 
-.05 -.15 .62**   
5. PM thought rate 
(open report) 
-.14 .02 .04 -.12  
Experiment 2 
1. OT word MRT  .11 .20 .11 -.15 
2. PM hit rate -.25  -.34* -.39** .57** 
3. TUT rate (forced-
choice) 
.02 .20  .77** -.42** 
4. TUT rate (open 
report) 
.09 .23 .74**  -.39** 
5. PM thought rate 
(open report) 
-.10 -.13 -.23 -.38*  
Experiment 3 
1. OT word MRT  -.05 .11 .12 .05 
2. PM hit rate .22  -.17 -.31* .47** 
3. TUT rate (forced-
choice) 
-.16 -.37*  .55** -.21 
4. TUT rate (open 
report) 
-.25 -.34* .75**  -.54** 




-.31* -.44*  
Note. OT = ongoing task; MRTs = mean response times in milliseconds; PM = prospective 
memory; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts. Correlations for Experiments 2 and 3 refer to the 
second task phase. The low-demand and the reward conditions are presented below the diagonal 
and the high-demand and the no-reward conditions above. * p < .01. **p < .01. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the central findings of the previous experiments that people with 
pending intentions engage in a stronger on-task focus than those without. This on-task focus was 
even further increased when the PM-task goal was associated with a monetary reward, 
suggesting that people focus especially on their current tasks while PM goals of higher personal 
relevance are active. In line with previous research (Cook et al., 2015), associating PM execution 
with a monetary reward resulted in better PM performance that was not accompanied by 
significantly higher levels of PM-induced costs. Furthermore, we again observed PM-induced 
costs in terms of slowed ongoing-task responding that were best reflected by changes in the ex-
Gaussian parameter μ. These results suggest that the categorical PM task causes subjects to 
monitor relatively continuously for PM targets while performing the ongoing task (Ball et al., 
2015). 
In sum, the results from Experiment 3 provide strong evidence that people who are motivated to 
adhere to their current task goals engage in a stronger on-task focus (as indexed by fewer TUTs). 
General Discussion 
The primary aim of the present research was to gain a better understanding of how people deal 
with the attentional demands from pending intentions by asking them about the thoughts they 
have while performing the PM/ongoing-task ensemble. In three experiments, we replicated 
previous research showing that holding a PM intention interferes with ongoing-task processing 
(e.g., A.-L. Cohen, 2013; A.-L. Cohen et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). Moreover, 
the present thought-report results also demonstrated that the addition of a PM task to an ongoing 
task not only interferes with ongoing-task processing but also changes the engagement in TUTs, 
implying a generally stronger attentional focus on the task ensemble. Whereas the former finding 
is in line with numerous previous empirical studies, the latter finding is novel and has 
implications for PM theorizing. 
Most existing theories of PM assume (implicitly or explicitly) that attentional capacities or 
mechanisms are shared between pending PM intentions and a currently ongoing task (Guynn, 
2003; McDaniel et al., 2015; Scullin et al., 2013; Smith, 2010) and they do not consider the 
possibility that there may be a third draw on attentional processes, namely, the engagement in 
TUTs. Most explicitly, Marsh, Hicks, and colleagues suggested that, when forming an intention, 
people also decide how they distribute their attention between the ongoing task and the PM 
intention (Hicks et al., 2005; Marsh et al., 2003). The present findings are in line with this 
general idea. More specifically, we assume that the PM-induced costs stem from the fact that 
both the ongoing task and the PM task require basic executive (top-down) processes to some 
extent and thus PM processing interferes with ongoing-task processing (see also McDaniel, 
Lamontagne, Beck, Scullin, & Braver, 2013). 
Recent PM research has shown that the level of PM-induced costs to an ongoing task depends 
not only on actual PM task demands, but also on people’s expectancies regarding those demands 
(Lourenço et al., 2015; Rummel & Meiser, 2013). The level of engagement in attentional PM 
processing therefore seems to lie under personal (metacognitive) control. Findings that 
attentional PM processing is adjusted in line with information regarding the context in which a 
PM target will occur (Ball et al., 2015; Kuhlmann & Rummel, 2014; Lourenço et al., 
2013; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2006) further speaks to the flexible adjustment of PM processing. 
If attentional PM processing indeed reflects strategic decisions about how to succeed in an 
ongoing task without forgetting one’s intentions, it is plausible that, when holding intentions, 
people not only shift attention between the ongoing task and the PM task, but also become more 
consciously focused on the overall PM/ongoing-task ensemble. This idea is also well in line with 
the idea from the mind-wandering literature that TUTs interfere with most concurrent tasks, 
especially when these are demanding, and that task engagement is thus adjusted to current 
cognitive demands (Casner & Schooler, 2014; Kane et al., 2007; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). The 
present finding of a stronger on-task focus (i.e., fewer TUTs) in the presence of a pending 
intention renders the first empirical support for this idea: people’s minds seem to wander less 
while holding a PM intention in addition to engaging in their ongoing activities. When the 
current PM and ongoing-task goals are of high personal relevance, moreover, mind wandering 
occurs on even fewer occasions and the preliminary correlative pattern suggest that the reduction 
in mind wandering may come with improved PM performance. Thus, engaging a stronger on-
task focus (with “task” referring to the entire ensemble of ongoing and PM tasks) seems to be an 
effective strategy to improve PM. 
The present findings seem consistent with two prominent mind-wandering theories. On the one 
hand, the context-regulation theory (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) predicts that mind wandering 
will be actively reduced in situations where demands from ongoing tasks require attention. On 
the other hand, the executive-failure theory (Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009) 
predicts that less mind wandering will occur when task demands increase, not necessarily due to 
an active resource withdrawal from TUTs, but also potentially due to a stronger on-task focus 
(i.e., a stronger maintenance of task goals). From the present findings, unfortunately, we cannot 
determine whether participants consciously reallocated attentional resources from TUTs or 
consciously focused more on their current task goals and reduced their TUT engagement in 
doing so; this may be an interesting question for future research. 
That being said, future studies might profitably address the extent to which PM-induced 
reductions in TUTs are strategic, or the result of metacognitive assessments of the task context 
and demands. Recent evidence from Seli, Smilek, and their colleagues suggests that mind 
wandering is sometimes intentional and sometimes unintentional. That is, if you ask subjects 
why they were mind wandering at a particular moment, they usually report doing so 
unintentionally but they also report intentional mind wandering at nonnegligible rates (Seli, 
Carriere, & Smilek, 2015; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016; see also Forster & Lavie, 
2009; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990-91). We did not assess the intentionality of participants’ mind 
wandering experiences here, but it might be fruitful to do so in future work. If the PM-related 
reduction in TUTs selectively reduced intentional rather than unintentional mind wandering, it 
would be probably more in line with the idea that an active reallocation of attentional resources 
underlies the observable reduction in TUTs. 
What we can conclude is that people do show fewer TUTs when they hold unfulfilled intentions. 
This new insight may help refine current theories on the role of attentional processing in PM 
because it can explain some puzzling results. For example, manipulations that affect the 
motivation to perform well in a PM task, like associating intention failures with monetary 
rewards (current Experiment 3; Cook et al., 2015; Kliegel, Brandenberger, & Aberle, 2010) or 
social consequences (Altgassen, Kliegel, Brandimonte, & Filippello, 2010; Brandimonte et al., 
2010), often improve PM performance without substantially increasing ongoing-task costs. Any 
PM theory that considers only two mental “tasks” (i.e., the ongoing task and the PM task) that 
engage attentional processes has difficulties explaining these findings. By taking into account a 
third form of mental activity—mind wandering—from which people may disengage in order to 
focus more strongly on the current PM and ongoing-task goals (as empirically shown in 
Experiment 3), attentional-processing theories of PM remain candidates for explaining such PM 
improvements in the absence of additional ongoing-task costs. 
Notably, in line with most current PM theories—that is, PAM theory (Smith, 2010; Smith & 
Loft, 2014), 2PSM theory (Guynn, 2003; Horn & Bayen, 2015), and MPT (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 2010; McDaniel et al., 2013; Scullin et al., 2013)—we assumed that ongoing and PM 
tasks of a typical PM ensemble both rely on the same attentional processes (likely inhibition and 
shifting processes; cf., Schnitzspahn et al., 2013) to be executed and that this is the reason why 
holding a PM intention slows down ongoing-task responding. This view was recently challenged 
by Heathcote et al. (2015), who proposed a delay theory of PM. These scholars argue that PM-
induced costs to an ongoing task reflects a strategic slowing of ongoing-task responding to gain 
more time for PM responding, rather than an attentional process. They used a diffusion modeling 
approach to test this idea and found that PM-induced costs are mostly due to a more careful 
response-criterion setting rather than changes in information accumulation. Due to suboptimal 
data structure for this purpose (cf., Heathcote et al., 2015), we did not apply a diffusion model to 
the present data. However, the ex-Gaussian modeling of RTs showed that especially the μ 
parameter (and sometimes also τ) mirrored the PM-induced costs. These results suggest that the 
addition of the PM task may cause processing changes of different kinds. That is, people may 
perform their ongoing tasks generally more carefully to ensure that they do not miss any PM 
targets, at least in the case of rather demanding PM tasks like the category target task we used, 
but they may also sometimes engage in additional attentional processing, such as rehearsing the 
PM intention and a strategic search for the targets (cf., Loft et al., 2014). This idea is also 
tentatively supported by our exploratory finding that individual differences in PM-related 
thoughts predict PM performance under some conditions. 
On a conceptual level, neither the classic attentional processing views (Guynn, 2003; McDaniel 
et al., 2015; Smith, 2003, 2016) nor delay theory’s assumption of more thoughtful ongoing-task 
performance (Heathcote et al., 2015) yet incorporate the present idea that the addition of a PM 
task causes—in addition to any strategic changes within the PM/ongoing-task setting—a 
generally stronger attentional focus on the overall PM/ongoing-task ensemble. Both theories 
could, however, easily be updated to account for such a process. We hope that this new approach 
will help to broaden our understanding of attentional PM processing and inspire new research in 
this area. 
Footnotes 
1 One student was 51, all others were 35 and younger. 
2 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that an alternative mechanism that could explain the 
simultaneous observation of faster ongoing-task performance in combination with higher PM-hit 
rates would be the establishment of a more lenient criterion for PM responses. We agree with 
this idea, but as the reviewer also argued, such a more lenient PM response criterion would also 
result in more false PM responses. We would thus not consider this a simultaneous improvement 
of performances in both the ongoing and the PM task. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there 
may be potential mechanisms other than the reduction of TUTs that may result in simultaneous 
performance improvements in both tasks of the PM ensemble. 
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